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Thirty years ago deflation was considered an historical anachronism, a relic of
economic history, yet in the 1990s Japan began a decade long slow deflation, and in the
last recession of 2001 the U.S. economy also flirted with deflation This revived danger of
deflation prompted current Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke to give a major
policy speech (2002) addressing the economic dangers of deflation. In that speech
Bernanke stressed that the Fed was committed to preventing deflation and had the tools to
do so. Moreover, Bernanke revisited the subject a year later (2003) in an article titled
“Why the world’s central bankers must become more vigilant about falling prices.”
Deflation has therefore again become a real possibility and is also now a real policy
concern.
The revival of deflation invites renewed theoretical appraisal of the phenomenon.
In a seminal paper published more than thirty years ago, the late James Tobin (1975)
explored the logic of Keynesian analysis of recessions and depressions. The current paper
uses Tobin’s theoretical framework to explore the Keynesian approach to deflation
further.
The paper shows how Tobin’s framework can provide a comprehensive analysis
of deflation that shows why downward price level adjustment may be unable to solve the
Keynesian problem of unemployment. As such, Keynes’ (1936) General Theory cannot
simply be dismissed as a special case resting on downwardly rigid prices and nominal
wages.
The paper makes a number of innovations. First, it incorporates the impact of
nominal interest rate floors and the liquidity trap. These have traditionally been examined
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in the context of comparative static price level analysis, but they are also deeply relevant
to the analysis of deflation.
Second, the paper introduces inter-temporal expenditure substitution effects,
whereby agents delay expenditures to take advantage of lower future prices. In terms of
the familiar ISLM model, this introduces an IS channel for deflation that complements
the Tobin – Mundell effect that operates via the LM.
Third, the paper introduces inside-debt effects associated with Irving Fisher’s
(1933) debt – deflation hypothesis. This serves to unite Tobin’s (1980) comparative static
price level analysis of the Fisher debt effect with his analysis of deflation.
Fourth, the paper expands Tobin’s model so that it addresses the question of
whether increased price flexibility is stabilizing. The model confirms other research
showing that increased price flexibility can be destabilizing.
Finally, the paper closes with a policy section. The received wisdom is that
Keynes’ analysis was predicated on downward price rigidity, and this has led many
economists to recommend policies promoting price flexibility. Over time, adoption of
such policies has made for a new environment in which deflation is more likely. This
gives contemporary policy relevance to the analysis in Tobin’s (1975) paper showing that
deflation may aggravate the problem of Keynesian (demand deficient) unemployment.
II The Tobin model of deflation and depression
A particular strength of Tobin’s model is its clear demarcation between the effects
of deflation (falling prices) and reductions in the price level. This distinction is illustrated
in Figures 1.a and 1.b. Figure 1.a shows a reduction price level, while Figure 1.b shows
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deflation that generates a continuously falling price level. 1 Deflation does over time
generate a lower price level, but in addition it generates expectations of falling prices and
lower future prices. The strength of the Tobin model is that it captures the effects of both
a lower price level and expectations of falling prices.
The impact of deflation works via aggregate demand (AD) which is determined
according to the conventional framework given by
+ + +
(1) E = E(y, i-πe, M/p, G)
- - +
(2) M/p = L(i, πe , y)

Deleted:

where E = level of demand, E(.) = AD function, y = level of income, i = nominal interest
rate, πe = expected rate of deflation (which is positive in the case of inflation), M =
nominal money supply, p = price level, G = government and other autonomous
expenditures, and L(.) = real money demand function. 2 Signs above arguments are the
assumed signs of partial derivatives.
Equation (1) is the AD function in which AD depends positively on income,
negatively on the expected real interest rate and positively on the real money supply
reflecting the operation of the Pigou (1943) real balance effect.
Equation (2) is the money market clearing condition, which has real money
supply equal to real money demand. The demand for real money balances depends
positively on deflation (negatively on inflation), reflecting the Tobin-Mundell effect.
1

This distinction between deflation and price level reduction has parallels with the distinction in monetary
theory between the neutrality and super-neutrality of money.
2
Throughout the paper the analysis is conducted under the assumption of a fixed nominal money supply. If
the nominal interest rate is fixed, the nominal money supply is endogenous. This leaves the conclusions of
the analysis unchanged. Indeed, a fixed nominal interest rate amplifies the adverse effects of deflation
because the nominal rate does not fall, which raises the real interest rate. Endogenous money with a fixed
nominal interest rate is therefore analogous to a policy imposed liquidity trap, which is examined in section
III.
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Expected deflation increases the demand for real money balances because deflation
increases the real value of money balances, thereby prompting agents to shift the
composition of their portfolios towards money. The nominal interest rate reflects the
opportunity cost of holding money and represents the return from holding other assets.
Expected inflation reflects the own cost of holding money and represents the own return
on money holdings. 3
Combining equations (1) and (2) yields a general reduced form for AD given by
+-- + +
+ +
(3) E = E(y, i(πe, M/p, y) - πe, M/p, G).
An increase in the rate of deflation lowers AD and output because it increases money
demand, leading to higher nominal and real interest rates. A lower price level increases
AD and output via the Keynes real money supply and Pigou real balance effects.
This specification of AD is then placed in a classical macroeconomic framework
in which equilibrium output is equal to full employment output, y*. This implies that in
equilibrium
(4) y = y* = E
This static equilibrium framework is then supplemented by three dynamic
adjustment equations that govern the evolution of the state variables – output, inflation,
and inflation expectations. It is these dynamic equations that give the model a Keynesian
dimension as output adjustment is assumed governed by the level of excess demand.
Thus, positive excess demand elicits an expansion of output, while negative excess
demand elicits a contraction of output.
The dynamic adjustment equations are given by
3

The general equilibrium microeconomic rationale for including inflation as a separate argument in money
demand is discussed in Tobin and Brainard (1968) and Tobin (1969).
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+
(5.a) gy = A(E – y)
+
(5.b) π = B(y – y*) + πe
+
(5.c) gπe = C(π - πe)

A1 > 0
B1 > 0
C1 > 0

where gy = rate of change of output, π = actual inflation, gπe = rate of change of inflation
expectations, and y* = full employment output. Equation (5.a) is an output adjustment
equation and has output responding positively to excess demand. Equation (5.b) is a
natural rate Phillips equation in which inflation is determined as a function of the output
gap and inflation expectations. Equation (5.c) determines the adjustment of inflation
expectations according to an adaptive principle.
An important feature of the model is that it describes an economy with a natural
rate of unemployment. This can be seen from equation (5.b), the Phillips equation, which
has a full employment level of output, y*. The economy is supposed to gravitate to y* via
the process of price adjustment if the economy is stable. The existence of a full
employment level of output is therefore not the issue. The macroeconomic question is
whether the process of general price level adjustment can restore full employment in the
face of aggregate demand weakness that causes unemployment.
The long run steady state equilibrium is given by y = y*, p = p*, and πe = 0.
Appropriate substitution and manipulation, combined with linearization around steady
state equilibrium values, yields the following set of linearized adjustment equations:
+ +
|A1[Ey – 1]
++
(6.b) |Δp | = |B1p*
++
(6.c) |gπe | |C1B1
(6.a) |gy |

+ A1Ep
0
0

+ A1Eπe | [y – y*]
+
p* | [p – p*]
0

| [πe – 0].
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Following Tobin (1975), the condition for stability is p*Ep + C1Eπe < 0. This condition can
be labeled the “Tobin condition”, and much of the rest of the analysis in the paper
focuses on how this condition is impacted as the structure of the model is changed. The
term Ep reflects the strength of the Pigou and Keynes money supply effects, while the
term Eπe reflects the strength of the Tobin-Mundell effect. Stability requires that the
Pigou and Keynes effects dominate the Tobin-Mundell effect. 4
The terms Ci and Eπe are critical for stability, and the larger their absolute value
the greater the likelihood of instability. The term Ci captures the speed of adjustment of
deflation expectations, while the term E3 captures the sensitivity of AD to deflation
expectations. If adjustment is rapid and AD is very sensitive to deflation expectations, the
Tobin–Mundell effect will be large, and hence potential instability.
Equations (6.a) – (6.c) provide an analytical understanding of the model’s
stability. This can also be understood through graphical representation. Equation (3) can
be represented as a set of iso-AD contours drawn in [πe, p] space, as is done in Figure 2.
The slope of the contours is obtained by differentiating equation (3) with respect to p and
πe, yielding
δp/δπe = [Eiiπe - Ei]/[EiiM/p + EM/p]M/p2] > 0 if Eiiπe - Ei > 0.
The condition Eπe = Eiiπe - Ei > 0 ensures that the Tobin-Mundell effect holds so that
higher inflation lowers the real interest rate or, alternatively, that higher deflation raises
the real interest rate. The positive slope of the iso-AD contours reflects the competition
between the Keynes and Pigou effects versus the Tobin–Mundell effect. A lower price
level increases AD via the Keynes and Pigou effects, so that holding AD constant calls
4

The stability condition is taken from Tobin (1975). Bruno and Dimand (2006) have recently produced a
manuscript that formally derives this condition.
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for a stronger Tobin-Mundell real interest rate effect operating via more rapid deflation
expectations. Lower iso-contours are associated with higher levels of AD, so that AD1 >
AD0. The logic is that a lower price level, holding deflation expectations unchanged,
increases AD via the Keynes and Pigou effects.
Figure 3 shows a set of iso-AD contours with three different price adjustment
paths. One path has prices falling infinitely fast with no impact on deflation expectations.
This path corresponds to what Tobin terms Walrasian price adjustment, and AD increases
along this path so that the economy moves toward full employment. This price
adjustment effect can be captured in the ISLM model and corresponds to the case where a
lower price level shifts both the IS and LM schedules down through the Pigou real
balance and Keynes money supply effects respectively. Along this path, deflation
expectations are zero because the price level jumps instantaneously from its initial level
to its new equilibrium level and remains unchanged thereafter..
The middle price path has prices falling and deflation expectations initially rising
and then falling back to the equilibrium value of zero. This path also leads to higher isoAD contours so that the economy again moves toward full employment. However, for
any given price decline the increase in AD is smaller than the Walrasian case because
deflation expectations increase, and this increases money demand and real interest rates
via the Tobin–Mundell effect. Along this price path the term C1Eπe (the potential cause of
instability) is dominated by the term p*Ep.
The third price path has prices falling and deflation expectations continuously
rising. Now, the economy is moved to an iso-AD contour with a lower level of AD so
that the economy is further away from full employment. This is the case where deflation
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is destabilizing. The reason is that the Tobin-Mundell effect now dominates the Pigou
and Keynes effects.
III Nominal interest rate floors and the liquidity trap
The original Tobin model can now be modified to incorporate the impact of
nominal interest rate floors and the “liquidity trap.” In the liquidity trap the nominal
interest rate is stuck at its floor level of iF. The trap may occur due to adverse asset price
and interest rate expectations that make holding money attractive (Keynes, p.207), or it
may be the result of intermediation costs combined with the zero floor to nominal interest
rates (Keynes, p.208). Either way, there is a nominal floor at or slightly above zero,
below which the nominal interest rate cannot fall.
The economic significance of the trap is that increases in the rate of deflation no
longer generate offsetting declines in the nominal interest rate through price level effects
on the real money supply. 5 With nominal interest rates trapped at their floor, deflation has
the effect of raising real interest rates. This liquidity trap effect on real rates operates in
addition to the Tobin–Mundell interest rate effect, and it strengthens the adverse impact
of deflation on AD.
The incorporation of a liquidity trap changes the Tobin condition and increases
the likelihood of instability. A critical parameter for stability is the magnitude of Ep.
Absent a liquidity trap, this is given by Ep = [EiiM/p + EM/p]M/p2. After incorporating a
liquidity trap this expression becomes Ep = EM/pM/p2, which is smaller in absolute value,
therefore increasing the likelihood of instability. A second critical parameter is the
magnitude of Eπe, which absent a liquidity trap is given by Eiiπe - Ei. After incorporating a
5

The interest rate benefit of a lower price level, resulting from the Keynes money supply effect, is blocked
by the liquidity trap.
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liquidity trap it becomes -Ei, which is larger in absolute value, therefore also increasing
the likelihood of instability as determined by the stability condition. The economic logic
of these two changes is that the liquidity trap eliminates the expansionary Keynes real
money supply effect and strengthens the contractionary Tobin-Mundell effect. 6
The impact of the liquidity tap is graphically depicted in Figure 4. Once deflation
reaches a rate of minus iF, equal to the interest rate floor, further acceleration in the rate
of deflation results in one-for-one increases in the real interest rate. As a result the isoAD contours are kinked at iF and become steeper. The slope of the iso-AD contours in a
liquidity trap is given by
δp/δπe|liquidity trap = - Ei/[EM/p]M/p2 > [Eiiπe - Ei]/[EiiM/p + EM/p]M/p2] .
Terms involving changes in the nominal interest rate go to zero since the nominal interest
rate cannot change. The absolute value of the numerator is unambiguously larger, and the
value of the denominator is unambiguously smaller. The economic logic for the
steepening of the iso-AD contour is that deflation now has a stronger adverse impact on
AD via the real interest rate, and this calls for a larger price level decline (Pigou real
balance effect) to maintain a constant level of AD.
The significance of the liquidity trap is that it increases the likelihood of
deflationary instability. As shown in Figure 3, the steepening of the iso-AD contours at
the kink means that some price adjustment paths that would earlier have carried the
economy to a higher iso-AD contour and full employment, no longer do so. Along these

6
Groth (1993) examines the Tobin model without a Pigou effect or inside debt but with a non-linear money
demand, and finds that non-linearity increases proclivity to instability. His findings are a rediscovery of the
liquidity trap. As the price level falls, the real money supply increases. However, non-linearity of money
demand means that the interest rate decline is smaller, thereby shrinking the Keynes money supply effect
on aggregate demand and increasing the likelihood of instability.
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paths a falling price level initially raises AD, but once the economy hits the liquidity trap
zone, further movement along the price adjustment path generates falling AD.
IV Consumption and investment spending delay effects
The liquidity trap focuses on the implications of nominal interest rate floors in
the presence of deflation. Another consequence of deflation is that it gives agents an
incentive to delay consumption and investment expenditures in order to benefit from
lower future prices. This is the channel whereby expectations of lower future prices
operate. The microeconomics of expenditure delay effects have been explored in an
earlier paper by Neary and Stiglitz (1983). They have also been revisited by Krugman
(1998).
Consumption and investment spending delay effects can be readily included in the
model by re-specifying the AD function as follows
+ - + + +
(1.1) E = E(y, i-πe, πe, M/p, G) .
The one change is the introduction of the expected rate of deflation as a separate
argument in the AD function, with increases in the expected rate of deflation (negative
inflation) lowering AD. The logic is that agents extrapolate future prices based on their
deflation expectations, thereby giving rise to inter-temporal substitution effects that
reduce current spending.
This inclusion of deflation expectations in the AD function remedies a failing in
the standard ISLM model that dichotomizes and treats as independent portfolio stock
choices and spending flow decisions. Spending, saving and portfolio allocation decisions
are all part of a unified utility maximization problem and are taken simultaneously. This
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means that arguments influencing money demand (e.g. deflation) must also influence
flow goods demands. 7
The static economics of spending delay effects are easily illustrated in the familiar
ISLM diagram. Inclusion of spending delay effects mean that deflation now operates on
both the IS and LM schedules. Not only is there an upward shift in the LM schedule
owing to the Tobin–Mundell effect, but there now is also a downward shift in the IS
schedule owing to expenditure delay effects. The net result is to increase the
contractionary effects of deflation.
Expenditure delay effects also change the Tobin condition and impact the stability
properties of the model by changing the critical parameter Eπe. After incorporating
spending delay effects, EEπe becomes Eiiπe - Ei + EEπe, where EEπe is the consumption and
investment expenditure delay effect of deflation expectations. The entire expression is
larger in absolute value, therefore increasing the likelihood of instability according to the
stability condition.
This proclivity to increased instability can again be understood in terms of the isoAD contour diagram. Expenditure delay effects steepen the slope of the iso-AD contours,
and the slope is now given by
δp/δπe = [Eiiπe - Ei + EEπe]/[EiiM/p + EM/p]M/p2] > 0 if Eiiπe - Ei + EEπe > 0.
The economic logic behind the steepening of slope is that deflation expectations have an
additional negative impact on AD owing to consumption and spending delay effects.
Maintaining the level of AD for any given rate of deflation expectations therefore

7

This analytic shortcoming of the conventional ISLM model is emphasized by Tobin (1982) in his end-ofperiod multi-asset ISLM model in which portfolio stock and spending flow decisions are part of a unified
choice decision. That means arguments that enter asset demand functions must also enter flow expenditure
functions.
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requires a lower price level. Steepening the iso-AD contours then makes instability more
likely. Some price adjustment paths that were previously stable can become unstable with
the additional spending delay effects.
Consumption and investment spending delay effects can then be combined with
liquidity trap effects. Both effects work in the same direction, and both steepen the slope
of the iso-AD contours. In terms of Figure 3, adding spending delay effects steepens the
iso-AD contours, which further increases the likelihood that deflation is destabilizing.
V The Fisher debt effect
All of the above analysis assumes that a lower price level has a positive effect on
AD owing to the Pigou real balance and Keynes money supply effects. Fisher
emphasized the adverse effect of lower prices on debtors via increased real debt burdens,
which can then lower AD because debtors have a higher propensity to spend than do
creditors.
The Fisher debt effect, operating through the price level, has been analyzed in
Tobin (1980) and Palley (1999). Its impact is readily captured in the ISLM model as
shown in Figure 5. A lower price level shifts the LM downward (the Keynes effect), but
it also shifts the IS downward if the Fisher debt effect dominates the real balance effect.
If the IS shift is sufficiently strong, AD and output fall. Moreover, if the economy is at
the nominal interest rate floor, then AD and output always fall since there is no Keynes
money supply effect to shift the LM schedule.
The incorporation of a Fisher debt effect dramatically changes the model.
Inclusion of inside debt changes the AD function, which is now given by
+ - + +
- +
(1.2) E = E(y, i-πe, πe, M/p, D/p, G)
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where D = level of nominal inside debt. The partial derivative with respect to nominal
debt, ED, is negative, reflecting the Fisher debt effect. Recall, that the Tobin condition for
stability is p*Ep + C1Eπe < 0. The Fisher debt effect changes the parameter Ep which
becomes [EiiM/p - EM/p]M - EDD}/p2. This makes Ep smaller in absolute value, making
instability more likely. Indeed, Ep can even become positive, in which event the economy
is unambiguously unstable. 8
Once again the issues of stability can be analyzed with the help of the iso-AD
diagrams. Combining equation (1.2) with equation (2) then yields
+ -- + + + +
- +
(3.2) E = E(y, i(πe, M/p, y) - πe, πe, M/p, D/p, G).
Totally differentiating with respect to π and p yields the slope of the iso-AD contour,
which is given by
δp/δπe = [Eiiπe - Ei + E2]/{[EiiM/p + EM/p]M + EDD}/p2 >< 0
where Eiiπe - Ei + E2 > 0 and {[EiiM/p + EM/p]M + EDD} ><0.
There are two cases to be considered. The first is when the Fisher debt effect is
dominated by the Pigou and Keynes effects. The second is when the Fisher effect
dominates.
Case 1. If the Fisher debt effect is non-dominant then [EiiM/p + EM/p]M + EDD > 0
and the iso-AD contour remains positively sloped. However, since EDD < 0, inclusion of
a Fisher debt effect means that the denominator is smaller and the absolute value of the

8

The current specification models inside debt in terms of real debt, D/p. A second possibility is in terms of
debt service burdens, V = i(p,..)D/p. Because a lower price level can lower the nominal interest rate, the
Fisher debt effect requires δV/δp < 0. Alternatively, debt must be fixed rate. A third specification is in
terms of the debt service-to-income ratio, i(p,..)D/py. In this case, the economy is likely to be even more
prone to deflationary instability. This is because deficient demand leads to both price deflation and output
contraction, and this amplifies the Fisher debt effect by decreasing both p and y.
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derivative is larger, so that the slope of the iso-AD contour is larger. The reason for
steepening of the iso-AD is that lower prices have a smaller stimulating impact on AD
owing to the negative Fisher debt effect. This means that any increase in deflation
expectations (which lowers AD) needs a larger decrease in the price level to hold AD
constant along the iso-contour. A steeper slope in turn means that the set of stable price
adjustment paths shrinks. The existence of inside debt effects therefore renders the
economy more prone to instability. Moreover, the likelihood of instability depends on the
level of inside debt, D, which enters in the expression for the slope of the iso-AD
contour.
Case 2. If the Fisher debt effect, EDD, dominates the Pigou and Keynes effects,
then [EiiM/p + EM/p]M + EDD < 0. In this case the slope of the iso-AD contours changes
and becomes negative. Since a lower price level now has a negative impact on AD,
maintaining a constant level of AD calls for lower expected deflation. In addition to
reversing the slope of iso-AD contours, the Fisher debt effect also reverses their rank
ordering so that higher iso-contours are associated with lower levels of AD. The logic is
that a lower price level raises debt burdens and lowers AD so that a lower rate of
deflation is needed to induce a more expansionary Tobin–Mundell effect.
Figure 6 shows the case where the Fisher debt effect dominates and iso-AD
contours are negatively sloped. In this case, price deflation is unambiguously unstable,
with all price adjustment paths leading to lower iso-AD contours. Even when there is
Walrasian-style instantaneous price adjustment with the price level falling without any
impact on deflation expectations, the economy still moves to a lower iso-AD, and the
process of price adjustment remains unstable.
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VI Is increased price flexibility stabilizing?
In the 1980s there was a flurry of interest in whether increased price flexibility is
stabilizing. In particular, two important papers by De Long and Summers (1986) and
Caskey and Fazzari (1987) explored this issue, and both concluded that increased price
flexibility could be destabilizing. These price flexibility concerns can also be
incorporated in the Tobin framework.
Price flexibility can be identified with the function B(.) in equation (5.b) that
determines the sensitivity of inflation to the output gap. Recall the Tobin condition for
stability is p*Ep + C1Eπe < 0. The partial derivative B1 does not appear in this condition,
implying that the degree of price flexibility is irrelevant for the stability of the system. As
originally constructed, the Tobin model therefore has nothing to say about the degree of
price flexibility. The implication is that increased price flexibility will not undermine
stability. Consequently, if the system is stable, increased price flexibility is desirable as it
will speed up the return to full employment equilibrium.
The reason why price flexibility does not matter in the Tobin model is that
expectations are purely adaptive, and that means current developments regarding prices
do not affect behaviors regarding either money demand or spending.
This weakness in the model can be remedied by introducing what can be termed
near rational adaptive expectations. According to this specification agents are concerned
not only about the expected level of inflation, but also about the direction in which
inflation expectations are headed. This adds an additional piece of important information.
Such a formulation results in the following re-specification of the AD and money demand
functions:
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+ + + +
e
(1.3) E = E(y, i-π , M/p, gπe, G)
- - - +
(2.3) M/p = L(i, πe , gπe, y).
The changes are that AD and money demand now depend on how fast inflation
expectations are changing, as captured by the term gπe. Combining equations (1.3) and
(2.3) then generates a reduced form given by
+ -- - + + + + +
(3.3) E = E(y, i(πe, gπe, M/p, y) - πe, M/p, gπe, G).
If inflation expectations are rising (gπe > 0), this further reduces money demand and
further lowers the nominal interest rate. In effect, it strengthens the Tobin-Mundell effect.
Additionally, higher rising inflation gives agents an incentive to bring forward their
consumption and investment expenditures to avoid higher future prices. These enhanced
Tobin–Mundell and expenditure delay effects work in the opposite direction when there
is deflation.
The dynamics of the model remain governed by equations (5.a) – (5.c).
Substituting (3.3) into (5.a), and using a linear approximation for gπe = C1B1πe, the
dynamic model can be linearized around its steady state equilibrium values to yield
+ +
|A1[Ey – 1]
++
(5.3.b) |Δp | = |B1p*
++
(5.3.c) |gπe | |C1B1

(5.3.a) |gy |

+ A1Ep
0

+ + + + +
A1[Eπe +EgC1B1]| [y – y*]
+
p*
| [p – p*]

0

0

| [πe – 0].

The modified Tobin condition for stability is then given by p*Ep + C1[Eπe +EgC1B1] < 0.
The Tobin – Mundell effect (Eπe) is now augmented by a near rational adaptive
expectations effect (EgC1B1) that reflects whether the rate of deflation is accelerating or
decelerating. The term in the square parentheses is now larger and more positive, making
17

it more likely that the stability condition is not satisfied. Now, both the sensitivity of
inflation expectations and the sensitivity of inflation to the output gap matter, and they
feed through in a compound fashion.
The economic logic is simple. The more flexible prices are, the greater the current
response of deflation to a shock. This deflation response is then picked up through the
near rational adaptive expectations mechanism to augment the Tobin - Mundell effect and
the expenditure delay effect.
VII Conclusion: rethinking macroeconomics and macroeconomic policy
The above analysis has extended Tobin’s (1975) Keynesian model of recession
and depression to include nominal interest rate floors, consumption and investment
expenditure delay effects, the Fischer debt effect, and increased price flexibility effects.
Tobin’s framework provides a tractable model for comprehensively dealing with the
phenomenon of deflation, and identifies the analytical conditions in which deflationary
price adjustment is destabilizing.
Not only does the analysis have significant theoretical implications, but it also
sheds light on important current policy concerns expressed by Federal Reserve Chairman
Ben Bernanke (2002, 2003). Deflation is a problem in credit-money economies, and the
likelihood of instability increases with the level of inside debt.
Beyond this, there is a deeper policy reason for addressing deflation. Modern
macroeconomics starts with the claim that Keynes’ analysis of recession and depression
represents a special case conducted under conditions of downward price and nominal
wage rigidity. 9 The belief that such rigidities are the cause of macroeconomic

9

This position was articulated by Modigliani (1944) and became received wisdom with the neo-Keynesian
synthesis and the Keynesian fix-price general dis-equilibrium paradigm launched in the 1970s (Barro and
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unemployment remains a core tenet of modern macroeconomics, and research continues
to focus on the causes and impacts of rigidities.
Such rigidities may well exist and be of interest in their own right. However, a
Keynesian analysis of recession and depression shows that removing them would not
resolve the problem of deficient demand, and might even amplify it. Nominal rigidities
may in fact be the only way of anchoring a monetary production economy as suggested
by Keynes (p. 269):
“To suppose that a flexible wage policy is a right and proper adjunct of a
system which on the whole is one of laissez-faire, is the opposite of the
truth.”
At the policy level, the identification of downward price and nominal wage
rigidities as an obstacle to full employment has promoted policies fostering downward
price and nominal wage flexibility. Thus, the New Deal and post-Word War II set of
institutions that fostered downward rigidity have been gradually eroded and replaced by a
set of arrangements that foster flexibility, and there is now accumulating evidence that
deflation could be a feature of future economic downturns.
From a Keynesian standpoint, such policy is misguided. Lack of downward price
and nominal wage flexibility is not the problem, and enhanced flexibility actually
amplifies the problem in modern economies with extensive nominally denominated
financial liabilities. Downward rigidities are a stabilizing feature in monetary economies.
Instead, a monetary economy needs relative price and nominal wage flexibility
that is implemented in an environment of gently rising prices. Relative price flexibility

Grossman 1971, Malinvaud 1977). This paradigm in turn prompted a shift in macroeconomic research
toward providing micro-founded explanations for downward price and nominal wage rigidities.

19

allows individual markets and sectors to clear, while upward price level drift avoids the
problem of deflation and the Fisher debt effect.
The Keynesian price adjustment conundrum is that market forces do not produce
such a pattern. In recessions there are no market forces generating upward drift of prices
and nominal wages; pressure is downward. This feature provides macroeconomic
justification for such institutions as trade unions and minimum wages that work against
deflation. However, for the past thirty years, policy has worked to restore downward
price and nominal wage flexibility, slowly eroding these institutions. This erosion may
have gone sufficiently far to restore 19th century style deflations as a feature of future
business cycle downturns.
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Figure 1.a. Price level reduction
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Figure 1.b. Deflation
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Figure 2. Iso-AD contours in Tobin’s model of recession and depression in
which there is a positive Pigou and Keynes effect. AD0 < AD1 < AD*.

24

Price level, p

AD0

AD1 = y*

Deflation
expectations, πe

Inflation
expectations, πe

Figure 3. Three different price adjustment paths. AD increases along
the two steep paths where the price level falls rapidly with little impact
on deflation expectations. AD falls along the third path. AD0 < AD1.
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Figure 4. The liquidity trap at -iF results in a kinked iso-AD
contour. As a result, price adjustment paths that initially increase
AD can lower AD and become unstable on entering the liquidity
trap. AD0 < AD1.
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Figure 5. The effect of a lower price level (p0 > p1) in the ISLM
model when the Fisher debt effect dominates the Pigou and Keynes
effects.
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Figure 6. Iso-AD contour map when the Fisher debt effect
dominates the Pigou and Keynes effects. AD2 > AD0 > AD1.

28

